11:00:00 - 12:00:00,
Thursday 9 May, 2013
Instruments of code-borne attack span a wide spectrum, from generic but low-potential tools to specific but high-potential weaponised software. Maximising the destructive potential of such tools is likely to come with a double effect: it will significantly increase the resources, intelligence, and time required for development and deployment ñ and more destructive potential is likely to decrease the number of targets, the risk of collateral damage, and the political utility of weaponised computer code. Do these assumptions hold up? If yes, what are the implications?
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- Name: Dr Thomas Rid
- Affiliation: King’s College London
- URL: http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/readers/rid.aspx
- Bio: In 2009/2010, Rid was a visiting scholar at the Hebrew University and the Shalem Center in Jerusalem. From 2006 to 2009 he worked at the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, the RAND Corporation in Washington, and at the Institut français des Relations Internationales in Paris. Rid wrote his first book at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin major foreign policy think tank. Rid holds a PhD from the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Thomas Rid has published four books: Cyber War Will Not Take Place (Oxford University Press/Hurst), Understanding Counterinsurgency (Routledge 2010, co-edited with Tom Keaney), War 2.0 (with Marc Hecker, Praeger 2009, and in Chinese by the People’s Liberation Army Press 2011), and War and Media Operations (Routledge 2007). His numerous articles appeared in major English, French, and German peer-reviewed journals as well as magazines and newspapers.